Economic aspects of the eastern enlargement of the European Union by Welfens, Paul J.J.
www.ssoar.info
Economic aspects of the eastern enlargement of
the European Union
Welfens, Paul J.J.
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Forschungsbericht / research report
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Welfens, P. J. (1999). Economic aspects of the eastern enlargement of the European Union. (Berichte / BIOst, 7-1999).
Köln: Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-
ssoar-43914
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
 Die Meinungen, die in den vom BUNDESINSTITUT FÜR OSTWISSENSCHAFTLICHE UND INTERNATIONALE 
STUDIEN herausgegebenen Veröffentlichungen geäußert werden, geben ausschließlich die Auffassung 
der Autoren wieder. 
© 1999 by Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, Köln 
Abdruck und sonstige publizistische Nutzung – auch auszugsweise – nur mit vorheriger Zustimmung des 
Bundesinstituts sowie mit Angabe des Verfassers und der Quelle gestattet. 
Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, Lindenbornstr. 22, D-50823 Köln, 
Telefon 0221/5747-0, Telefax 0221/5747-110; Internet-Adresse: http://www.uni-koeln.de/extern/biost; 
e-mail: biost.koeln@mail.rrz.uni-koeln.de 
 
ISSN 0435-7183 

  
 
 
Inhalt 
 Seite 
Kurzfassung.......................................................................................................................  3 
1. Eastern Enlargement as a Community Challenge..............................................  5 
2. The Community Facing the Start of the Euro ....................................................  6 
3. Eastern Europe After the First Transition Stages..............................................  8 
4. Agenda 2000 and Institutional Challenges for Accession 
Countries.................................................................................................................  13 
5. Theory of Economic Integration and Application to 
Enlargement ...........................................................................................................  15 
6. Policy Challenges and Conclusions ......................................................................  21 
References .........................................................................................................................  25 
Summary ...........................................................................................................................  29 
 
 15. Januar 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Der Verfasser ist Professor für Wirtschaftspolitik und internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 
an der Universität Potsdam sowie Leiter des dortigen Europäischen Instituts für internationale 
Wirtschaftsbeziehungen. 
 
Redaktion: Brigitta Godel/Christian Meier 

Wirtschaftliche Aspekte der EU-Osterweiterung 3 
Paul J.J. Welfens 
Wirtschaftliche Aspekte der EU-Osterweiterung 
Bericht des BIOst Nr. 7/1999 
Kurzfassung 
Vorbemerkung 
Die EU will in zwei Runden eine Osterweiterung nach 2001 realisieren, wodurch die Zahl der 
Mitgliedsländer auf 21 bzw. 26 steigen würde. Für die EU ergibt sich eine Reihe von Anpas-
sungserfordernissen durch jede Art von Osterweiterung, die unmittelbar im Anschluß an die 
volle Umsetzung der Währungsunion beginnen würde. Während auf die EU-15-Länder durch 
eine EU-Osterweiterung verstärkte Finanzierungslasten zukommen, können zugleich 
ökonomische Vorteile einer EU-Erweiterung nicht übersehen werden – zumindest für die 
lange Sicht. Ein wesentliches politisch-psychologisches Problem einer EU-Osterweiterung 
liegt darin, daß erhöhte budgetäre Beitragsleistungen wichtiger Mitgliedsländer unmittelbar 
sichtbar sind, während die "Club-Vorteile" der Erweiterung zumindest für die Altmitglieder 
nur indirekt sichtbar werden. Am Beispiel von Modellsimulationen für Österreich kann 
gezeigt werden, daß die Belastungen einer ersten Erweiterungsrunde für Staatshaushalt und 
Arbeitsmarkt eher gering sind – ja, es sind Nettovorteile zu erwarten. Sehr viel 
problematischer dürfte ein zweite EU-Osterweiterungsrunde sein, wobei wegen der 
inhärenten Verknüpfungen der beiden Erweiterungsrunden diese Problematik schon in der 
ersten Runde dringend zu bedenken wäre. Besonders wichtig wäre eine EU-
Verfassungsreform, und zwar inklusive Maßnahmen zur Begrenzung eines relativen 
politischen Übergewichts der kleineren EU-Mitgliedsländer. Vorschläge zur Reform der EU-
Strukturpolitik bzw. der Budget-Prioritäten sind gleichfalls dringlich. 
Ergebnisse 
1. Eine EU-Osterweiterung schafft erhebliche Anpassungsprobleme für die EU-Struktur- und 
die EU-Agrarpolitik, da die Beitrittskandidaten mit Ausnahme von Tschechien relativ arm 
und durch hohe Anteile der Beschäftigung in der Landwirtschaft gekennzeichnet sind. 
2. Eine erste EU-Osterweiterungsrunde dürfte zu erheblichen Handelsschaffungseffekten und 
damit zu mehr Wirtschaftswachstum führen. Die Nettowohlfahrtseffekte für Österreich 
sind eindeutig positiv, so daß für Deutschland ähnliche Größenordnungen gelten könnten. 
3. An den EU-Ostgrenzen sind die Unterschiede im Pro-Kopf-Einkommen größer, als eine 
Durchschnittsbetrachtung der EU-Osterweiterung erwarten läßt, so daß gravierende regio-
nale Divergenzen – auch als Wanderungsanreize – zu beachten sind. 
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4. Mit einer EU-Osterweiterungsrunde ergibt sich nicht nur erheblicher wirtschaftspolitischer 
Reformbedarf bei der EU-Wirtschaftspolitik. Vielmehr entstehen erhebliche 
verfassungspolitische EU-Probleme, da sich die Machtbalance zwischen reichen und 
relativ armen Ländern einerseits und zwischen großen und kleinen Ländern andererseits 
verschiebt. Diese Verschiebungsprobleme der Machtbalance wird mit einer zweiten EU-
Osterweiterung außerordentlich gravierend, so daß man die Probleme schon im Vorfeld 
der ersten Erweiterungsrunde bedenken sollte. 
5. Die EU droht nach einer zweifachen Osterweiterung zu einer Gemeinschaft zu werden, in 
der verstärkt wachstumsfeindliche budgetäre Umverteilungspolitik und von daher verlang-
samter beschäftigungsfeindlicher Strukturwandel drohen. Zudem könnte angesichts wach-
sender ökonomischer Divergenz in einer erweiterten EU die politische Führungs- und Ge-
staltungskraft der Gemeinschaft geschwächt werden. 
6. Bei der EU-Strukturpolitik gibt es relativ einfache Möglichkeiten zu einer Reform, schwie-
riger ist die Situation in der Agrarpolitik. Um mehr Wachstum und Beschäftigung in der 
EU zu erreichen, wären neue EU-Budgetprioritäten sinnvoll, insbesondere höhere 
Ausgaben für Innovationsförderung und zur Stimulierung einer europäischen 
Informationsgesellschaft. 
7. Da die EU-Osterweiterung das ökonomische Gewicht der EU vergrößert, kommt einer er-
weiterten Gemeinschaft mehr globale Verantwortung zu. Durch eine institutionelle bzw. 
EU-Verfassungsreform könnten hierzu die Grundlagen verbessert werden. 
8. Eine EU-Osterweiterung dürfte Rußland indirekt schwächen, da diesem Land Handelsab-
lenkungseffekte bzw. Wachstumsverluste drohen. Dem könnte durch ein Freihandelsab-
kommen entgegengewirkt werden. Darüber hinaus sind neue EU-seitige Ansätze zur Stabi-
lisierung Rußlands einerseits und die Schaffung neuer beitrittspolitischer Optionen – unter-
halb einer EU-Mitgliedschaft – andererseits erwägenswert, wenn Stabilität und Wohlstand 
für ganz Europa gesichert werden sollen. 
9. Das EU-Modell der sozialen Marktwirtschaft hat, nachdem Reformen in der Wirtschafts- 
und Tarifpolitik durchgeführt worden sind, durchaus gute Chancen, im globalen System-
wettbewerb mit dem US-Modell zu bestehen. Nach der Asienkrise haben sich jedenfalls 
die Aussichten verbessert, daß Wirtschaftsordnungen europäischen Typs mit ihrer 
Doppelbetonung von Effizienz und sozialem Ausgleich international als attraktives Modell 
erscheinen. 
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1. Eastern Enlargement as a Community Challenge 
The EU has decided to conduct negotiations on eastern enlargement which would consist of 
two enlargement rounds, each comprised of five eastern European post-socialist economies. A 
first round started in 1998 and could be completed around 2002 and will also include Cyprus. 
After the Southern EU enlargement in the 1980s and the EFTAN enlargement round of the 
1990s the Community thus has envisaged another major round of EU-widening. For various 
reasons the eastern EU enlargement of the EU seems to be a very complex topic which in-
volves many economic issues. An eastern EU enlargement clearly is a historical challenge, 
both for western Europe and for the ex-CMEA area. 
A major challenge will be the integration of post-socialist transforming economies, namely 
countries whose economic system has changed to a market economy only recently so that 
there are young institutions, while economic behavior is not firmly rooted in market 
traditions. Since the prospective newcomer countries are also relatively poor one may 
anticipate that their natural interest is in favor of expanding the EU transfers via higher 
structural funds expenditures. Obviously, this would be neither conducive to sustained 
economic growth in the EU and the euro area, respectively; nor be in the interest of the main 
net contributors of the EU, namely the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and Austria which in 
1997 recorded per capita net contributions of euro 150, 140, 130 and 95, respectively; another 
net contributor was the UK with euro 33; disregarding the special case of the top recipient 
Luxembourg with its many EU institutions the main recipients were Ireland (euro 750), 
Greece (410), Portugal (290) and Spain (150) in 1987. The Netherlands and Germany were 
top net contributors with 0.7% of the respective GDP in 1997, and these countries clearly are 
rather unwilling to accept much higher contributions for the sake of EU enlargement. 
Moreover, the main net recipient countries which cannot expect to reap major benefits from 
an eastern EU enlargement in the medium term will be unwilling to accept strong cuts in 
transfers. At the same time there is no doubt that the EU-15 club will have to face major 
reforms in key policy fields if an eastern enlargement is to become feasible – with agricultural 
reforms and innovations in the field of regional policy being key areas which promise to be 
conflict-prone in western Europe. 
The reform proposals addressed at the Community itself aim at maintaining a maximum ratio 
of 1.27% of EU gross domestic product which can be spent at the supranational level. Since 
in the EU-15 community about 50% of expenditures is for agricultural subsidies and another 
third for structural funds accruing mainly (2/3) to regions with a per capita income of less 
than 75% of average EU per capita income ("objective 1 regions") and to regions with 
declining industrial employment ("objective 2 regions") any eastern EU enlargement entails 
the risk of strongly rising community expenditures. Post-socialist eastern European countries 
are poor; the share of agricultural employment and value-added is relatively high, and 
industrial employment in many regions is falling. 
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While EU-enlargement raises budgetary risks for the EU-15 this group can expect economic 
benefits from rising trade and investment – with individual countries gaining the more, the 
higher the respective share of east European trade. 
EU countries differ with respect to trade intensities vis-à-vis eastern Europe. The highest 
share of CEEC-10 merchandise exports was 9.2% for Austria in 1996, followed by Germany 
with 6.6% – with each country roughly tripling its share in the seven years after 1989. The 
CEEC share in German and Austrian imports reached about 6% in 1997 while other countries 
have much lower shares. 
A major challenge of eastern enlargement concerns the increasing economic divergence faced 
by the Community. Ignoring the outlier country Luxembourg the per capita income figures at 
purchasing power standards – with the EU average being 100 – were in the range of 67 
(Greece) to 116 (Denmark) in 1995, but with a first round of an eastern enlargement the dis-
parity would rise to 31 (Poland) to 116; we have ignored here the even lower and rather insig-
nificant case of the small country Estonia with its 1.5 million inhabitants. Since political pref-
erences are the less homogeneous the greater differentials in per capita income are across 
countries, sustainable enlargement requires speeding up economic convergence. 
A quick, purely market-driven economic convergence process is rather unlikely, but one 
should not rule out a successful medium-term convergence under certain conditions referring 
to domestic policies in accession countries and to adequate supranational EU cohesion policy. 
As regards income differentials one also has to take into account that at the central European 
border line of the EU-15 group the income differentials are higher than the average European 
east-west income gap since Germany and Austria stood for income levels of 110 and 112, re-
spectively. 
The following analysis will focus on the starting conditions for enlargement in the EU as well 
as in CEEC-10 in sections 2 and 3. The institutional challenges are discussed in section 4, 
while section 5 is devoted to the theory of integration and its application – and model 
simulations – to the issue of an eastern enlargement. Section 6 deals with policy options for 
sustainable enlargement. At the bottom line we find that economic theory suggests major 
economic benefits for both the accession countries and the old EU-15 community, but there 
are serious risks which come with enlargement with respect to the efficiency of future 
supranational decision-making; and there are the unsolved questions whether or not the 
increasing economic divergence within the ex-CMEA area will lead to conflicts. 
2. The Community Facing the Start of the Euro 
The single market dynamics are fully at work in the late 1990s and in combination with ongo-
ing economic globalization (OECD, 1997; Welfens, 1999) and a sharper international innova-
tion race (Welfens/Audretsch/Addison/Grupp, 1998) are fueling an economic upswing in the 
prelude to the start of the euro. Monetary union will reinforce market transparency and reduce 
EU internal transaction costs so that competition will intensify further. 
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Due to the convergence pressure associated with the euro project, most EU countries have 
achieved considerable progress with respect to key macroeconomic variables including low 
inflation rates and budget deficit-GDP ratios below the critical 3% ceiling in 1997/98. Many 
countries still are above the 60% limit for the debt-GDP ratio, but most countries face favor-
able medium-term prospects to converge towards this ratio provided no adverse shocks hit the 
EU and euro-land, respectively. The elimination of EU internal exchange rate volatility and 
the switch to reduced money supply volatility in the relatively large monetary union lets one 
expect higher investment-GDP ratios in the euro area (Jungmittag/Welfens, 1998). This 
positive growth effect normally should dominate the negative welfare effect which is 
associated with the loss of the exchange rate instrument in the monetary union. However, the 
question has to be raised which group of countries can easily forego the option of a nominal 
revaluation or devaluation – we will see later that large per capita income differentials among 
countries in a monetary union pose a case against monetary union. 
With 11 countries starting the euro and the European Central Bank in 1999 there is a new 
monetary regime in Western Europe, namely a centralized politically independent EU central 
bank with the goal of price stability. Since the exchange rate policy instrument is no longer 
available within euro-land there could be major problems in the presence of asymmetric eco-
nomic shocks – at least as long as labor mobility in euro-land is low and wage rigidity wide-
spread. While EMU has large potential economic benefits (Welfens, 1997; Welfens, 1998; 
Kenen, 1998) it is unclear whether intensified locational competition within euro-land, more 
integrated financial markets and accentuated competition will bring about required reforms in 
the social security system, in labor markets and in government. 
With the start of monetary union in 1999 the acquis communautaire (the set of relevant rules) 
is broadened in comparison to earlier enlargement rounds, e.g. the southern enlargement in 
the 1980s and the EFTA enlargement in the 1990s. This partly explains why the Community 
has decided to engage in technical and financial support measures for potential accession 
countries. While not all EU countries have to be members of monetary union they are 
required to introduce political independence of the central bank, multilateral surveillance in 
the field of convergence indicators and application of the stability and growth pact which 
basically stipulates that the deficit-GDP ratio should not exceed 3% except in cases of an 
extreme economic downswing or special adverse shocks. Given the enormous needs of 
transforming countries to invest in infrastructure, the 3% deficit ceiling implicitly restricts 
public investment to the extent that one can consider loan financing of investment as a natural 
strategy to share investment costs between present and future generations. A solution to the 
problem could be to increasingly rely on private financing and operation of certain 
infrastructures, e.g. toll highways, private airports and privatized telecommunication 
networks (EBRD, 1996; Welfens et al., 1998). 
Given the double problem of high EU unemployment and unsustainable social security 
systems facing the problems of a graying society, reforms of the public sector would have to 
reduce labor costs and reduce the fear of ever increasing social security contributions and tax 
rates which all impair regaining full employment. High unemployment rates create political 
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reservations against labor mobility and enlargement in EU countries. Partly replacing social 
security systems with voluntary private savings – in favor of new pension funds and life 
insurance schemes – is politically extremely difficult in Western Europe. As regards Poland 
and Hungary one should mention that these two transforming economies already have taken 
steps to replace the traditional pay-as-you-go system of social security with a capital funded 
pension system. 
3. Eastern Europe After the First Transition Stages 
Privatization of the economy, macroeconomic stabilization, economic opening-up and institu-
tional changes in the sphere of labor and capital markets as well as in economic policy were 
the main steps in the transition process which had largely been completed in Estonia, Poland, 
Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech Republic by 1998; other transforming countries lag behind 
for various reasons. Competition policy and R&D policy are crucial for transformation and 
growth (Ordover/Pittman/ Clyde, 1994; Slay, 1995; Fingleton/Fox/Neven/Seabright, 1996; 
Radosevic, 1995). It has been adopted in all post-socialist countries, although no transition 
country, except for Hungary, has an independent, credible anti-trust authority. Efficient 
corporate governance also is a crucial problem which is related to the mode of privatization 
chosen, the rules for the capital market and the most common incentive schemes for managers 
(Welfens, 1992; Jasinski/Welfens, 1994; Valbonesi, 1995). 
Facing declining internal demand and the switch to the new market conditions many trans-
forming economies recorded problems with the banking system which faced a high share – 
20-40% at some period – of non-performing loans. Concerns about financial market stability 
have increased in the wake of the Asian financial market crisis but also because one of the 
four freedoms of the single market calls for free capital movements – those could be easily 
destabilizing in a situation of adverse shocks hitting an unsound banking system. In the Czech 
Republic the share of non-performing loans in total loans declined gradually after 1994 (BIS, 
1998, p. 53); it fell more swiftly in Hungary and Poland. However, other CEECs, above all 
Bulgaria and Romania, have not yet sorted out financial market problems. 
In the period 1989-97 post-socialist transformation countries achieved considerable progress 
in the transition towards a market economy although one cannot overlook major divergences 
between the various ex-CMEA countries (see Table 1). Even within the Visegrad (starter) 
countries there are problems as became evident by the Czech currency crisis in 1997. This cri-
sis is mainly related to lack of efficient corporate governance and a weak banking system 
which in turn have slowed down the pace of structural change which is one of the keys to sus-
tained economic growth in the transition stage. Indeed, the transformation process in the for-
mer GDR clearly shows the important links between structural change, economic growth and 
factor rewards (Heilemann/Löbbe, 1996). 
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Table 1: 
Applicant Countries of Central and Eastern Europe and EU Member States (Basic Data 1995) 
 Area Population Density GDP at Current Prices GDP. Purchasing 
Power  
Agriculture 
 (1000m2) (millions) (inch/km2) (billion ECU) (ECU/head 
percentages of EU 
average) 
(ECU/head 
percentages of EU 
average) 
% of 
employment 
Hungary 93 10.2 110 33.4 19 37 8 
Poland 313 38.6 123 90.2 14 31 26.9 
Romania 238 22.7 95 27.3 7 23 34.4 
Slovak Rep 49 5.4 110 13.3 14 41 9.7 
Lativa 65 2.5 38 3.4 8 18 18.5 
Estonia 45 1.5 33 2.8 11 23 13.1 
Lithuania 65 3.7 57 3.5 5 24 23.8 
Bulgaria 111 8.4 76 9.9 7 24 23.2 
Czech Republic 79 10.3 130 36.1 20 55 6.3 
Slovenia 20 2 100 14.2 42 59 7.1 
CE 10 1078 105.3 98 234 13 32 22.5 
in % of EU 15 33 28 85 4   425 
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Continuation of Table 1: 
Belgium 31 10.1 332 205.9 118 112 2.7 
Denmark 43 5.2 1221 132.1 146 116 4.4 
Germany 357 81.5 228 1845.2 131 110 3.2 
Greece 132 10.4 79 87.4 48 66 20.4 
Spain 506 39.2 77 428.1 63 77 9.3 
France 544 58 107 1174.3 117 107 4.9 
Ireland 70 3.6 51 49.2 80 93 12 
Italy 301 57.3 190 831.4 83 103 7.5 
Luxembourg 3 0.4 157 13.3 187 169 3.9 
Netherlands 42 15.4 371 302.5 113 107 3.8 
Austria 84 8.9 96 178.4 128 112 7.3 
Portugal 92 9.9 108 77.1 45 67 11.5 
Finland 338 5.1 15 95.6 108 96 7.8 
Sweden 450 8.8 20 176.3 116 101 3.3 
United Kingdom 244 58.5 240 844.8 83 96 2.1 
EU 15 3236 371.6 115 6441.5 100 100 5.3 
Source:  CEECs Statistical Yearbooks, Eurostat. 
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Structural change in the course of systemic transition and economic opening-up will show up 
in the form of a high rate of intersectoral reallocation of labor so that the standard deviation of 
sectoral employment growth rates – measured across sectors – should be rather high (see 
Table 2). Boeri (1997) distinguished nine sectors and defines an expansion/contraction 
reallocation index and a reallocation/privatization index covering job flows from the state 
sector – including state-owned firms – to the private sector; a rising index indicates a higher 
speed of reallocation. The degree of structural change in the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and the Slovak Republic was much higher than in Bulgaria and Romania which lagged 
behind both in the process of privatization, in setting up functional capital markets and in 
opening up the economy. Poland and Hungary showed an increasing degree of structural 
change in the period 1993-95 as compared to 1991-93, and both countries showed a rising 
intersectoral employment reallocation which should facilitate productivity gains and real 
income growth. Poland indeed recorded high growth rates in the 1990s; Hungary's growth 
resumed after a temporary balance of payments crisis in the mid-1990s. 
Disregarding employment reallocation related to privatization one finds, however, a decline in 
employment dynamics and structural adjustment in the Czech Republic and in the Slovak Re-
public – partly reflecting corporate governance problems and the lack of strategic investors, 
respectively. The slowdown of economic growth in the former Czech Republic and the Czech 
balance of payments crisis in 1996/97 therefore are not surprising. The favorable indicator for 
the job flow/unemployment rate ratio for the Czech Republic is biased by the fact that the 
lack of bankruptcies and structural adjustment, respectively, kept the unemployment rate at an 
artificially low level. 
 
Table 2: 
Structural Change & Job Reallocation in Selected Countries (1991-95) 
Country       
  Standard 
Deviation of 
Growth Rates 
Intersectoral 
Changea) 
Intensity of 
Privatizationb)
Labor 
Market 
Dynamics 
Change in Labor 
Productivity 
96/92 
Poland 1991-3 
1993-5 
13.4 
11.1 
0.49 
0.74 
0.73 
0.70 
2.5 
3.0 
+++ 
Hungary 1991-3 
1993-5 
9.3 
7.0 
0.25 
0.53 
0.66 
0.88 
2.4 
2.6 
+++ 
Czech Rep. 1991-3 
1993-5 
21.0 
6.7 
0.77 
0.44 
0.78 
0.64 
14.9 
9.5 
++ 
Slovak Rep. 1991-3 
1993-5 
24.0 
7.0 
0.70 
0.38 
0.60 
0.88 
3.9 
2.6 
+ 
Bulgaria 1991-3 
1993-5 
13.5 
10.4 
0.36 
0.90 
0.68 
0.64 
1.9 
3.6 
+ 
OECD* 1990-3 3.1 0.33 0.09 5.2 + 
* Without east European member countries. 
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Definition: 
a) = 1 - 
where ΔΕ+ is the sum of sectoral job variations in expanding sectors (proxy for gross employ-
ment creation) and ΔΕ- the respective figure in declining sectors. 
Note: 
The sectoral reallocation index is based on gross employment changes across nine sectors. 
The privatization reallocation index is based on the flow dynamics of job outflows from the 
state sector and job inflows into the private business sector. Labor market dynamics is 
measured as monthly inflow into new jobs relative to the unemployment rate (at the 
beginning of the period). 
Source: Boeri (1997), Podkaminer (1997), and UNECE (1997). 
As regards key macroeconomic figures Romania, Bulgaria and Russia showed a much worse 
picture than the countries from the CEEC-5 group in the 1990s. While there is some risk that 
the first wave of an eastern enlargement transitorily will accentuate the income differentials 
within eastern Europe, one may anticipate that macroeconomic stabilization and institutional 
adjustment in the second group of accession countries will favorably be influenced by 
prospective EU membership. Prospects of EU membership provide adequate incentives, and 
EU technical support within the novel accession partnership should also facilitate the 
adjustment process. A more difficult problem is economic and political geography. The 
second group of accession countries is strongly exposed to potentially destabilizing impulses 
from Russia which has – much in contrast to the US or Canada and, more importantly, the 
early reformer China – been characterized by a legacy of declining structural change and 
increasing overspecialization in the 1980s (see Table 3) plus inconsistent transformation 
policies in the 1990s. 
 
Table 3: 
Industrial Specialization and Structural Change in Canada, the USA, China, and the USSR 
(1980 and 1990) 
1980 
 Canada USA China USSR 
Intensity of Structural Change 3.4 2.9 2.4 1.8 
Degree of Specialization 10.3 11.9 14.0 18.3 
1990 
 Canada USA China USSR 
Intensity of Structural Change 3.7 3.3 3.3 0.8 
Absolute Change 1990/80 0.3 0.4 0.9 -1.0 
Degree of Specialization 11.8 12.3 10.8 19.7 
Absolute Change 1990/80 1.5 0.4 -3.2 1.4 
⏐ΔΕ⏐ 
ΔΕ+ + ⏐ΔΕ-⏐ 
⏐ΔΕ⏐
⏐ΔΕPUB ⏐ + ⏐ΔΕPRIV⏐
b) = 1- 
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Calculations: 
Intensity of Structural Change:  Moving average (five years, in degree): 
 cos β =[Σsitsi(t-1)]/[(Σsit)2(Σsi(t-1))2] 
Degree of Specialization: h = 100 [1+(Σsi ln si)/ hMAX]; 
 hMAX= ln(number of the i sectors); 
 si=share of i in value added; 
 indicator h lies in the interval [0,100] 
Source: UNIDO and own calculations. 
Catching up with the EU will require high sustained economic growth which will be only fea-
sible if accession countries record high investment-GDP ratios, pursue outward-oriented eco-
nomic policies which support trade and foreign direct investment and if human capital forma-
tion – including R&D – are strongly promoted, while levels of foreign and domestic indebted-
ness of government are kept at manageable levels. As a mathematical exercise one can calcu-
late (Richter, 1998) that accession countries would need the following average annual growth 
rates to achieve 75% of EU per capita income at purchasing power standards in 2015: Czech 
Republic and Slovenia 3.4%, Slovak Republic 5.2%, Hungary 6.1%, Poland 6.9%, Romania 
9.2% and Bulgaria 10.1%. Such figures are obviously unrealistic although Poland came close 
to 7% growth in 1996/97. Even for the CEEC-5 group in a first round of eastern enlargement 
it therefore holds that many if not most regions would qualify as objective 1 regions which 
are characterized by a nominal income level of less than 75% of the EU average. 
4. Agenda 2000 and Institutional Challenges for Accession Countries 
The Agenda 2000 emphasizes that the challenges of an eastern enlargement can be coped 
with on the basis of reinforcing the pre-accession strategy – comprised of the Europe 
Agreements, the structured policy dialogue and PHARE – with two new elements: support for 
adopting the Community acquis via a single framework for all the resources and forms of 
assistance available ("Accession Partnership") and extending the participation of applicant 
countries to EU programs and mechanisms to apply the acquis. The Phare program will have 
two priorities, namely financial support for institution-building and financing of investment 
projects. There will also be pre-accession aid for agriculture and structural assistance at the 
regional level. The Accession Partnership will involve (European Commission, 1997, A-8) 
precise commitments on the part of the applicant country, relating in particular to democracy, 
macro-economic stabilization, nuclear safety and a national program for adopting the Commu-
nity acquis within a precise timetable, focusing on the priority areas identified in each opinion; 
(and) mobilization of all the resources available in the Community for preparing the applicant 
countries for accession. 
It is unclear from this statement whether a prime requirement for accession indeed is to intro-
duce and maintain democracy within the rule of law. The acquis itself consists of specific 
rules, above all in competition policy, trade policy, regional policy and monetary policy. 
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The Commission expects in its impact study – being part of Agenda 2000 – that extending 
Common Agricultural Policies (CAP) will cost some ECU 11 billion per year – an estimate 
which seems to be rather optimistic if compared to the range proposed by Tangermann 
(1997); the EU-15 budget in 1997 was ECU 88 billion. No major problems are anticipated in 
horizontal policies (social policies, environment, consumer, science, R&D, information 
society, culture-education-training-youth). With respect to sectoral policies the Commission 
also expects limited problems. The greatest problems will result from the increasing 
heterogeneity in terms of per capita income in an enlarged EU and the fall of average income 
(see Table 4) so that structural policy becomes quite important. 
 
Table 4a: 
Impact of Successive Enlargements of the EU 
(Based on 1995 Data) Increase in 
Area 
Increase in 
Population 
Increase in 
Total GDP 
Change in 
Per Capita 
GDP 
Average Per 
Capita GDP 
(EUR 6 
= 100) 
EUR 9/EUR 6 
EUR 12/EUR 9 
EUR 15/EUR 121 
EUR 26/EUR 15 
31% 
48% 
43% 
34% 
32% 
22% 
11% 
29% 
29% 
15% 
8% 
9% 
-3% 
-6% 
-3% 
-16% 
97 
91 
89 
75 
1 Including German Unification. 
Source: European Commission (1997), Agenda 2000, p. 22. 
 
Table 4b: 
Changes in the Population Eligible for Assistance Under the Structural Funds 
(Based on 1995 
Population Figures) 
Eligible 
Population 
(in thousands) 
Eligible Pop-
ulation as % 
(EU = 100) 
Objective 1 
Population 
(in thousands) 
Objective 1 
Population as % 
(EU = 100) 
EUR 12 1989 140 600 43.3 69 700 21.4 
EUR 15 1995 185 600 49.8 94 000 25.2 
EUR 26 2000+ 291 400 60.9 199 800 41.7 
Source: European Commission (1997), Agenda 2000, p. 25. 
Estimating the overall per capita GDP (at purchasing power standards) of the ten CEECs at 
about 1/3 of the EU-15 average the potential accession countries lie much behind the weakest 
four EU-15 countries, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland which together reached 74% of the 
Community average. Within the group of accession candidates – each with considerable inter-
nal regional divergences – the range is from 18% (Latvia) to 59% (Slovenia); in 1997 the 
poorest EU-15 country was Greece with a level of 2/3 of the EU average. The cohesion poli-
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cies in the enlarged EU would lead to sharply rising expenditures since the population eligible 
for assistance under objective 1 would rise from 94 to 200 million, and if the other objective 
criteria for regional policies were not changed, about 60% of the overall EU population would 
be covered which is inconsistent with the principle of special support for the most disadvan-
taged regions. 
There are urgent reform needs with respect to EU structural policies; an additional constraint 
proposed by the Commission is that financial funds devoted to cohesion efforts will be raised 
from 0.41% to a freezed 0.46% of Community GDP. Moreover, the Commission has 
proposed to maintain objective 1 regions while objective 2 and other objective regions should 
be merged in a "New Objective 2" definition; another horizontal objective 3 should be created 
which would focus mainly on supporting economic and social development, lifelong learning 
and training and active labor market policy. Creating a new objective 3 area is rather doubtful 
if it is not clear to which extent this promotes economic cohesion in a consistent way doing 
justice to the principle of subsidiarity at the same time. 
While on the one hand one may criticize EU structural funds which for the main recipient 
countries amounted to 1.4%, 2.6%, 2.7% and 2.8% of GDP (Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and 
Greece, respectively) in 1996/97, one could, on the other hand, point out that they reflect su-
pranational political leadership and indeed have been successful in promoting the economic 
catching-up process – except for the case of Greece. The US Marshall plan – including 
GARIOA funds – clearly was more generous than the envisaged financial support for 
accession countries and poor regions in the EU-15 group which together will not obtain more 
than 0.5% of Community GDP as transfers; the US transferred about 1% of its GDP which 
was equivalent to funds for the recipient countries in the range of 2.4% as in the case of the 
UK to 14% in Austria (Van Brabant, 1990, p. 108). The EU as a rather synthetical regional 
superpower obviously finds it more difficult than the US to invest in a transition process 
which should lead to growing trade between the EU and eastern Europe. Part of the reluctance 
of EU taxpayers to finance additional transfers to eastern accession countries can be 
explained by already high marginal tax and social security contributions in the EU where all 
countries except the UK have relatively high overall tax rates. 
5. Theory of Economic Integration and Application to Enlargement 
Following neoclassical trade theory one may expect major benefits for eastern European 
economies from opening-up and the switch to relatively free trade. The export-GDP ratio of 
Visegrad countries has increased and reached 26% in Poland, 33% in Hungary, 49% in Slove-
nia, 60% in the Czech Republic and 66% in the Slovac Republic in 1996; Bulgaria and Roma-
nia reached 32% and 30% respectively (IMF, 1997). An increase in economic efficiency 
stimulates economic growth and a rise of consumer welfare due to a higher level of consump-
tion. Modern trade theory additionally suggests benefits from a larger variety of goods avail-
able and from easier exploitation of static and dynamic scale economies. Integration theory 
suggests that creating a larger integration area will bring about trade creating effects raising 
output and welfare, but also trade diverting effects which impose negative welfare effects for 
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the integration area and former supplier firms from outsider countries. While standard 
neoclassical trade theory implies international factor price convergence and convergence of 
per capita income in a world without capital mobility, reality looks different. The more recent 
new trade and new growth theory has emphasized the role of R&D – with international 
spillovers – and of economies of scale as well as path-dependent economic development so 
that imperfect competition results in outcomes which are not compatible with the neoclassical 
model; indeed all these elements play a role both for Asian NICs and for east European 
transforming economies (Welfens/Wolf, 1997). 
Selected theoretical issues. Economic opening-up and integration should contribute via trade 
and FDI (Howell, 1995; EBRD 1997; Stern, 1997) to high economic growth in eastern Europe 
in the first transition stage so that distributional conflicts become less important and further 
transition steps towards a market economy feasible. With rising per capita income in eastern 
Europe east-west trade in Europe could be increasingly of the intra-industry type and less 
interindustrial which is conflict prone for structural adjustment. The share of EU-15 in the 
CEEC's trade increased markedly in the period 1989-1997 (See Table 5). FDI inflows were 
unevenly distributed where Hungary and the Czech Republic recorded high cumulative 
inflows (Table 6). 
 
Table 5: 
Share of the EU(15)1 in the Eastern EU Applicant Countries' Total Trade in Percent 
(Based on Customs Statistics) 
  1989 1993 1997 
Bulgaria2 Exports 6.0 30.0 43.3 
 Imports 12.5 32.8 37.3 
Czech Republic3 Exports 31.9 49.4 59.9 
 Imports 31.8 52.3 61.7 
Estonia4 Exports   48.7 
 Imports   59.2 
Hungary Exports 33.6 58.1 71.2 
 Imports 39.7 54.4 62.6 
Poland Exports 39.6 69.2 64.0 
 Imports 42.2 64.7 63.8 
Romania Exports 27.6 41.4  
 Imports 6.5  45.3 
Slovakia5 Exports 32.2 29.5 45.0 
 Imports 34.4 27.9 39.5 
Slovenia6 Exports 58.0 63.2 63.6 
 Imports 66.9 65.6 67.4 
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1) Austria, Finland and Sweden are included in the 1989-1994 data. 2) In 1992 methodological 
changes took effect; imports are FOB up to 1991 and CIF since 1992. 3) In 1993 and thereafter total 
trade figures include Slovakia. 4) In 1994 EU(9). 5) In 1993 and thereafter total trade figures include 
the Czech Republic. 6) In 1992 and thereafter total trade figures include ex-Yugoslavia. 
Source: WIIW Database incorporating national statistics. 
 
Table 6: 
Indicators of Foreign Direct InvestmentA in East European, Baltic and European CIS 
 Countries (1995-1997) 
 FDI Net Flow / GDP 
(%) 
Cumulative Inflow 
(mill. $) 
Cumulative Inflow 
Per Capita ($) 
 1995 1996 1997 1996 1997 1996 1997 
Eastern Europe 2.8 2.2 2.4 30670 39320 276 354 
AlbaniaC 2.9 4.5 2.0 291 339 86 97 
Bulgaria 0.7 1.4 4.4 446 884 53 105 
CroatiaC 0.4 2.6 1.8 830 1164 184 259 
Czech Republic 5 2.5 4 7282 8582 710 838 
Hungary 9.9 4.4 3.7 13377 15462 1331 1548 
PolandC 1 2 2.2 5492 8526 142 221 
Romania 1.2 0.7 2.7 1237 2193 55 97 
Slovakia 0.9 1.1 0.4 886 1026 166 192 
Slovenia 0.9 0.9 1.6 785 1100 408 572 
The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of 
MacedoniaC 
 
 
0.2 
 
 
0.3 
 
 
0.2 
 
 
44 
 
 
52 
 
 
20 
 
 
24 
Baltic States 3.7 3.7 5 1959 3031 284 396 
Estonia 5.6 2.5 4.5 799 1106 602 760 
Latvia 5.5 7.5 7.3 864 1284 371 519 
Lithuania 1.9 1.2 3.8 296 641 101 172 
European CIS 0.5 0.5 0.9 9669 17117 45 80 
BelarusA 0.1 0.5 1.2 111 273 11 26 
Republic of Moldova 4.5 2.7 2.3 152 195 34 44 
Russian Federation 0.5 0.5 0.9 8092 14789 55 100 
Ukraine 0.7 1.2 0.9 1345 1861 26 36 
Total Above 1.6 1.3 1.6 42329 59468 127 179 
A) Cash basis. 
B) Estimates of FDI by extrapolating partial year rates to the entire year (except for the Czech Repu-
blic and Hungary for which full year data were available). January-November rates were used for Po-
land, Slovakia and Slovenia; January-September rates were applied for all other countries except Ro-
mania, which are official estimates. 
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C) In reporting country except for Albania, Poland and the former Republic of Macedonia for which 
data are net of residents abroad. 
Source: UNECE (1998), p. 63. 
From a theoretical perspective an economic opening-up in eastern Europe and EU 
enlargement should bring about five main growth-related effects for accession countries 
whereby the first three refer to traditional arguments in textbook literature and recent 
extensions in modern trade theory (Baldwin, 1992; Baldwin/Seghezza, 1996): 
• efficiency gains due to increased import competition in eastern Europe; 
• economies of scale effects related to EU market access; 
• gains from specialization and a rise in the range of product varieties which allow 
realization of a higher level of consumption and utility, respectively; 
• growth effects related to imports of intermediate products and technology-intensive ma-
chinery and equipment where positive spillover effects could occur. Coe/Helpman (1993) 
found – in a study for OECD countries – a significant impact of trade-weighted cumulated 
R&D stocks of trading partners; hence, provided that consumption goods are not dominant 
on the import side one may emphasize the crucial role of rising imports for growth and 
transition, respectively; 
• increasing EU foreign direct investment flows to eastern Europe, in particular in the case 
of an EU eastern enlargement which effectively eliminates political risk from the 
perspective of an EU investor. With respect to eastern Europe there will be FDI diversion 
as US would-be investors might be crowded out by EU firms which enjoy particular 
advantages in investing in an enlarged home market. At the same time the overall fall in 
the implicit risk premium for eastern Europe will cause FDI creation so that the steady 
state FDI flows and the respective FDI stock/GDP ratio should increase (Welfens, 1994). 
The long-run increase in capital intensity should – in line with traditional analysis – lead to 
higher labor productivity and hence rising real wages in eastern Europe. 
In the spirit of the neoclassical trade theory one may also analyze trade-induced changes in 
specialization and in relative factor rewards. For the most active EU exporters to eastern Eu-
rope one typically finds that factor content of exports is mainly capital and skilled labor so 
that removal of trade barriers and EU enlargement, respectively, suggest that in a situation of 
rising EU net exports the demand for skilled labor will increase in Western Europe leading to 
a rising wage differential between skilled and unskilled labor. This conclusion for which 
Smith (1997) provided empirical evidence is, however, not valid for all countries, and the 
paradox case of a declining wage dispersion will subsequently indeed be explained for the 
case of Austria. 
The first attempts to quantify the effects of EU enlargement used gravity models of trade and 
computable general equilibrium models (e.g. Winters/Wang, 1994; Holzmann/Zukowska-
Gagelmann, 1997; Gasiorek/Smith/Venables, 1994; Ambrus-Lakatos/Schaffer, 1996); more 
recently gravity models for foreign direct investment (Döhrn, 1996) have also been used. 
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Gravity models emphasize the role of economic growth and geographic distance in explaining 
trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), respectively. 
Advanced computable general equilibrium models suggest considerable economic benefits 
from an eastern EU enlargement – for the case of Austria see Keuschnigg/Kohler (1998) who 
find within a computable general equilibrium model positive growth, employment and 
revenue effects for Austria. There are, however, some issues to be raised in the context of a 
critique of the model setup or – put differently – in the context of potential extensions of the 
model: 
• How will the introduction of FDI into the trade-dominant traditional models affect the 
cost-benefit issue for eastern Europe? While there is little doubt that FDI stimulates 
technology transfer and thus contributes to higher growth there are obviously political 
reservations against high FDI inflows in some CEECs, especially with respect to German 
investment which raises historical fears of dominance. Moreover, asymmetric international 
property rights certainly will impair the convergence of real per capita GNPs and thus 
undermine the neoclassical convergence message from neoclassical textbook models 
which ignore FDI and the necessary distinction between GNP and GDP. An illustrative 
asymmetric two country model with identical production functions Y=Kexpß Lexp(1-ß) 
and identical stocks of labor L and capital K in country I and II, respectively, will result in 
equal GDPs (Y in country I, which is the source country of FDI, Y* abroad – in country 
II), while per capita GNPs (y and y*) will strongly differ in the illustrative case that 
country I owns the capital stock of both countries (Welfens, 1994, 1997); the source 
country of FDI will record a GNP = Y + ßY* while country II will record a GNP = Y*(1–
ß); the ratio of per capita GNPs will be Y(1+ß)/(Y(1-ß)) = 2:1 in favor of the source 
country of foreign direct investment. As regards economic convergence and cohesion, 
respectively, this points to the importance of nurturing ownership-specific advantages of 
firms by a stimulating domestic policy and market environment in eastern Europe so that 
FDI flows become a two-way avenue. Also, if eastern European countries have become 
source countries of FDI themselves the political reservations against FDI inflows are likely 
to be reduced. 
• Given the models' general equilibrium setup, how can transitory unemployment be covered 
which represents important individual risks and political costs. An answer could be sought 
along the lines of positive quadratic adjustment costs for workers shifting from declining 
to expanding sectors where adjustment is time-consuming. Sectoral adjustment costs could 
be ranked by the divergence in skill-intensities – factor content differentials – of the 
respective sectors concerned; i.e. if declining sectors are mainly dominated by unskilled 
workers while expanding sectors have a high share of skilled workers, the adjustment costs 
will be higher than in the case of skill symmetry between declining and expanding sectors. 
• Eastern enlargement could have major real exchange rate effects on the euro-dollar rate. If 
the euro should appreciate there will be two negative effects for the EU-15 group, namely 
reduced net exports to the rest of the world and falling net FDI inflows from the US and 
other third countries. The latter effect is a generalization of an empirical study of Froot/ 
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Stein (1990) which find in a model with imperfect capital markets that normalized US FDI 
inflows are reduced by a real appreciation of the dollar. 
• Depending on the type, scope and speed of the first wave of EU enlargement there could 
be negative effects on the outsiders in eastern Europe which require the enlarged EU to 
come up with funds for stabilizing the outsider countries. If trade and investment diversion 
effects should undermine the expansion of the outsiders – including the countries within 
the former USSR area – political tensions within Europe and worldwide could grow 
imposing immediate costs on the EU taxpayer who no longer will benefit easily from a 
peace dividend.  
• Finally, there is the issue of membership in monetary union. If poor accession countries are 
entering the euro zone too quickly, the result could be economic stagnation, high unem-
ployment and political conflicts in the new member countries. 
From a structural adjustment perspective one should highlight the problem of relative price 
adjustment, exchange rate flexibility and economic catching-up in some detail. In the course 
of economic development and economic catching-up one can anticipate a change of the real 
exchange rate and the relative price of nontradables to tradables (price PN/PT), respectively. 
The problem is compounded by empirical evidence that price arbitrage for some tradables is 
rather imperfect even after the reduction of trade barriers in Europe. Richards/Tresman (1996) 
report that prices of farm products in Latvia reached only about 1/3 of the level in Sweden.  
Defining the relative price PN/PT as the real exchange rate one will normally witness a rise of 
this price ratio in the process of rising per capita incomes (Kravis/Lipsey, 1983, 1987; Asea/ 
Mendozo, 1994). Indeed relative price adjustment is crucial for structural change and 
economic growth. We will argue that monetary union creates some specific problems for ac-
cession countries, i.e. strictly fixed exchange rates would be inappropriate as would be too 
early monetary union. Defining the price level as P = (PN)β(PT)1-β and assuming international 
price arbitrage such that the domestic price of tradables PT = ePT* – with ß, e and PT* repre-
senting the share of nontradables in overall consumption, the nominal exchange rate and the 
world market price level of tradables, respectively – one would face a major problem in a re-
gime combining price stability and fixed exchange rates. Moving towards membership in 
euro-land indeed is such a regime where we assume that the European central bank achieves 
price stability. With the accession country pegging its exchange rate to the euro its own 
monetary policy will have to pursue price stability as well. Since the price level P=(PN/PT)β PT 
the requirements of price stability and international price arbitrage imply a constant relative 
price of nontradables to tradables. This in turn impairs structural change and growth. An 
alternative would be periodic appreciations of the currency so that e will fall over time thus 
bringing about the required fall of the relative price of tradables in the course of economic 
catching-up. 
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6. Policy Challenges and Conclusions 
In the medium term a first round of an eastern enlargement is feasible provided that structural 
adjustments in the EU and in the accession countries is accelerated. It is, however, rather 
doubtful whether a second enlargement round can contribute to stability and prosperity in Eu-
rope. Since the two enlargement rounds are inherently intertwined one has to consider all the 
prospective issues of the second enlargement round already in the first round – otherwise 
there will conflicts over discrimination as well as a relative increase of the voting power of 
poor countries in a crucial period of EU constitutional reform. A special problem concerns the 
psychological imbalance between rising contribution payments of major net contributors and 
the invisible economic gains for countries such as Austria, Germany, Sweden and Finland 
which stand to gain from enlargement in form of higher economic growth and rising tax re-
ceipts.  
Eastern EU enlargements raise more than ever the issue of a Constitutional reform in the 
Community and of strong changes in EU budget priorities. There is little doubt that 
continuous political and economic instability in Russia would undermine the prospects for 
stability and growth in eastern Europe and the accession countries, respectively. Russian 
outmigration, an internationally expanding Russian mafia and a return to the Cold War – 
causing massive rises in EU countries' military spending – are three major problems resulting 
from failure of Russian transformation. These serious aspects should encourage EU countries 
and accession countries to support the transition process in Russia within a broad and 
consistent framework which combines technical and financial support with market opening 
for Russian exports. A crucial issue of enlargement concerns the relative weight of the EU in 
the global economy. Integrating eastern European countries will enlarge the EU single market 
and reinforce the global market power of EU companies in the long run. The EU-21 (or EU-
26) could thus also become more attractive for US and Japanese foreign investors which 
already are strongly represented in the EU-15 area. While there are many reasons why foreign 
investors would favor high income countries in the EU-15 area in the medium term high 
economic growth in post-socialist accession countries could reinforce the position of eastern 
Europe as a location of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. Relatively low wages, high 
infrastructure investment and a good education system make eastern Europe a relatively 
attractive host region provided that not internal political instability or negative spillover 
effects from Russian instabilities undermine the interest of foreign investor in the region. 
A key issue to be raised is whether the EU and euro-land, respectively, will be strengthened in 
the long term by an eastern enlargement. GDP of euro-11 reached euro 5546 bill., the EU-15 
figure will be some euro 7000 in 1999. For comparison the US GDP also will reach nearly eu-
ro 7000 bill. in that year. In the long run an eastern EU enlargement by Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia should increase the EU GDP by slightly more than 
10%. Exports of the euro-11 group – excluding internal trade – reached euro 757 bill. in 1997 
which is more than twice the Japanese figure (370 bill.) and slightly higher than the US figure 
of 607 bill. A first round of an eastern enlargement could increase the relative weight of EU 
trade in the long run and thereby reinforce the role of the Community in international organi-
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zations. euro-land had foreign exchange reserves equivalent to euro 376,9 bill. in 1997 which 
was three times the US figure (119.3). In this field the relative position of euro-land will not 
be improved by an eastern enlargement since foreign exchange reserves – at least those with 
national central banks – are likely to be reduced in the future in the EU. By contrast, an 
eastern EU enlargement will raise the employment ratio of the Community as the EU-15 club 
reached only 58.1% in 1979, while the US reached 72.9%. The traditionally high employment 
ratios of socialist eastern European countries will nearly be maintained after full 
transformation so that one may anticipate that enlargement will raise the average EU figure 
slightly.  
The EU's global weight cannot be reinforced if the Community would be characterized by 
growing internal conflicts – some of which could emerge in the context of high immigration 
from accession countries which could reach 350 000-600 000 people p.a. for Germany. Such 
conflicts can only be avoided of economic cohesion and full employment in both eastern and 
western Europe can be achieved. Therefore market-guided economic convergence is crucial 
as are reforms of labor markets leading to reduced unemployment figures. It is doubtful that 
the Community will be able to launch effective and efficient support for economic catching-
up of eastern European accession countries with a rigid EU expenditure limit of 1.27%. 
However, without agreement on a more even financial burden sharing in the EU-15 group it is 
unlikely that major net contributors (Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Sweden) will accept a 
rise of the EU budget limit. 
After the apparent collapse of the Asian growth model the EU approach to the social market 
economy looks more attractive than previously. The Asian crisis of the 1990s could reinforce 
the EU countries' willingness to launch institutional and policy reforms consistent with the 
need for developing a new pan-European international division of labor and to cope with eco-
nomic globalization. 
The risks of monetary union for accession countries should be carefully considered so that 
euro membership would be extended only after a successful minimum convergence process in 
terms of (reduced) per capita income differentials and sustained economic growth. If 
accession countries should join EMS II one should consider nominal depreciations and 
appreciations as an unavoidable element of a long-term convergence process. Artificial 
exchange rate stability should be avoided as much as strong misalignment. 
The biggest long-term challenges for a wider EU with 21 or 26 countries is that the ratio of 
small and poor countries relative to the large countries Germany, France, UK, Italy and Spain 
will increase dramatically. There is indeed a poor-country problem in an enlarged EU as well 
as a small country problem of decision-making in the EU policy club such as the European 
Union. 
With respect to a potential majority of poor countries in the EU, the main issue associated 
with the poor country problem is that with majority voting in the European Council one can 
anticipate political tendencies which will overemphasize redistribution and the growth of 
structural funds, respectively – political interference, which comes at high economic 
Wirtschaftliche Aspekte der EU-Osterweiterung 23 
  
opportunity costs, weakens the EU's global economic competitiveness and undermines the 
prospects for regaining full employment. 
With an increasing number of small countries, large countries' power – e.g. measured by the 
Banzhaf index from game theory (on the small country problem for EU decision-making in 
the context of an EFTA enlargement see Hosli, 1993) – is falling overproportionately so that 
there could be both lack of political leadership in an enlarged EU and growing frustration of 
big countries in the context of majority voting; such countries could even consider leaving the 
Community. The solution to these serious problems could lie in an EU constitution which 
would require small countries to form EU internal clubs (e.g. Belgium/Luxembourg, Baltic 
Countries) where a minimum population figure could be defined for an interior club. This also 
has to be considered for another reason, namely the inability of very small countries to come 
up with the necessary administrative resources for assuming the rotating presidency in the 
EU. It is fairly obvious that such constitutional issues must be solved prior to EU enlargement 
which poses serious problems of inefficient decision-making within a political club – much 
along the lines discussed in general terms by Buchanan/Tullock (1962) and Olson (1965, 
1982). 
A more practical challenge concerns financing of cohesion policies. The range of regions in 
eastern and western Europe qualifying as objective 1 regions could be reduced by redefining 
the 3/4 per capita income threshold on the basis of purchasing power standards and by reduc-
ing the threshold level to 2/3. Similarly, the cohesion fund (90% threshold for EU member 
countries) set up for euro candidates could be redefined adequately. Taking into account the 
principle of subsidiarity, EU competences and interference can be justified only for projects 
with positive international – EU-wide – external effects so that EU cohesion funds should be 
allocated to certain environmental projects and infrastructure investments but also to the pro-
motion of a European wide information society. The latter aim would be a new element, but it 
clearly could be justified on the principle of positive international network effects; moreover, 
it would be an active element of cohesion since recent analysis has shown empirical evidence 
that the use of telecommunications and information technology stimulates economic growth 
significantly (Jungmittag/Welfens, 1998; Antonelli, 1998). 
As successful economic catching-up is the key to avoiding excessive growth of EU structural 
funds, one should not pursue a strategy of rigidly fixing exchange rates of accession 
countries. EU eastern enlargement will mean even under favorable growth conditions that 
structural funds will have to increase while the relative share of EU-15 countries on the 
recipient side will have to fall. If budgetary risks are to be avoided for an enlarged 
community, the EU-15 group therefore must reform agricultural policies and structural funds 
in a way which basically reduces funds in favor of the old community. In EU-15 the main 
recipients on a per capita basis, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain can be expected to be 
opposed to a rapid eastern European enlargement. EU countries which have much to gain 
from expanding trade and foreign direct investment in an enlarged community are mainly 
Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy and France, but above all Germany and Austria. 
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In central Europe EU enlargement partly raises complex political questions. The integration 
situation in German-Polish border areas is much more difficult than in the case of Austria/ 
Hungary because Germany in general and east Germany in particular were characterized by 
high rates of structural unemployment in the late 1990s. As xenophobic reactions and reser-
vations against an eastern EU enlargement sometimes can be observed in Austria, it is all the 
more likely that such problems will be witnessed rather strongly in Germany. Additionally 
German-Polish and German-Czech relations are compounded by expellees in Germany which 
claim restitution of their property in formerly German regions of eastern Europe. Unsettled 
property issues and high, long unemployment in border regions could stimulate political radi-
calization in part of the enlarged EU – the result being less political cohesion and cooperation 
in the whole of Europe than prior to enlargement.  
Another big political problem concerns a possibly increasing economic divergence between 
the accession countries and the outsiders in eastern Europe, including Belarus, the Ukraine 
and Russia (Welfens/Yarrow, 1996; Welfens et al., 1998). From both a political and an 
economic perspective successful stabilization and growth in Russia are key to long-term 
stability in Europe. While the Russian government's decisions often have been doubtful with 
respect to stimulating the transformation process, one should also note that EU enlargement 
creates large trade diversion effects for Russia's trade. With prospects of 10 CEECs quasi-
defecting – which otherwise could be major outlets for a stable Russian market economy – 
there are poor prospects for Russia's export firms to strongly raise the export volume of 
industrial goods – unless there would be an EU-Russia free trade zone. This indeed can be 
recommended as a useful complementary policy option for EU eastern enlargement although 
one cannot overlook that it creates major long-term adjustment pressures for the wider 
Community. Finally, it is doubtful that the Community has no attractive alternative to full 
membership. A modified European Economic Space which e.g. could be defined as a Com-
mon Market without direct political representation in Brussels and without free movement of 
labor would be an interesting option. There are three more interesting problems requiring fur-
ther analysis in the context of enlargement: (i) The future transatlantic political and economic 
relations; (ii) Coping with rising environmental problems in Europe (Müller, 1998) where 
strongly rising trade will cause a massive increase of traffic and emissions respectively; and 
(iii) Shifts in the relative power of countries and regions, respectively, in international 
organizations. 
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Summary 
Introductory Remarks 
The EU intends to enlarge itself eastwards in two stages as of the year 2001, bringing the 
number of members up to 21 and eventually 26. Any manner of eastern enlargement 
commencing immediately after full consummation of monetary union will face the EU with a 
number of adaptation needs. While the eastern enlargement will place an additional financial 
burden on the EU 15 countries, there is no mistaking the economic advantages of enlargement 
– at least in the long term. A serious politico-psychological problem posed by the intended 
enlargement is that the higher budgetary contributions that the major member countries will 
to have to pay are visible immediately, while the "club benefits" of the enlargement, at least 
for the existing members, become visible only indirectly. A model simulation performed for 
Austria, by way of example, shows that the burdens on the national budget and the labour 
market as a result of the first round of enlargement will be relatively light – indeed, there are 
even bottom-line benefits to be expected. Much greater problems are likely to be experienced 
in the second round of enlargement, and, due to the inherent links between the two stages, it 
would be highly expedient already to take these problems into account in the first round. One 
particularly important necessity is a reform of the EU constitution, including measures to 
prevent a relative political preponderance on the part of the smaller EU members. Proposals 
for a reform of the EU's structural policy and for a re-assessment of its budget priorities are 
also urgently needed. 
Findings 
1. An eastern enlargement of the EU creates serious adaptation problems especially for the 
EU's structural and agricultural policies, because, with the exception of the Czech 
Republic, the candidates for admission are all relatively poor and have a high proportion of 
employment in agriculture. 
2. A first round of enlargement is likely to have a considerable trade-creating effect and thus 
promote economic growth. The net welfare effects for Austria are clearly positive, so that 
similar orders of magnitude can be expected for Germany, too. 
3. In the countries on the EU's eastern borders, the differences in per-capita incomes are 
broader than the average over the candidates for enlargement would suggest, so that allow-
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ance must be made for pronounced regional divergences – which could also act as incen-
tives for migration. 
4. Eastern enlargement generates considerable need for reform not only of the EU's economic 
policy. In fact, it gives rise to serious constitutional problems, because enlargement will 
shift the power balance between wealthy and relatively poor countries on the one hand and 
between large and small countries on the other. These problems of shifting power balances 
will become even more severe with the second round of enlargement, so it is important that 
they should already be taken into account in the lead-up to the first round. 
5. After a two-stage enlargement there would be a danger of the EU becoming a community 
in which more attention is paid to budgetary re-distribution policy, but this is detrimental 
to growth and could slow down structural change, with adverse effects on the employment 
situation. Also, widening economic divergence within the enlarged EU could weaken the 
community's political control and formative capabilities. 
6. As regards the EU's structural policy there are relatively simple formulas for reform; the 
situation is more difficult in the case of agricultural policy. To achieve more growth and 
employment in the EU it would be expedient to set new budget priorities, especially more 
expenditure to promote innovation and to stimulate a European information society. 
7. Since eastern enlargement would enhance the EU's economic weight, an enlarged commu-
nity would have to take on more global responsibility. The basis for this could be im-
proved by a reform of the EU's institutions and constitution. 
8. The eastern enlargement of the EU would probably indirectly weaken Russia, because it 
would divert trade away from that country and reduce its growth potential. These effects 
could be averted by signing a free-trade agreement. Furthermore, it would be worth 
considering new approaches by the EU in order on the one hand to stabilize Russia and on 
the other to create new options for Russian participation – below EU membership level – if 
stability and prosperity are to be assured for all of Europe. 
9. Following reforms in economic and wages policy, the EU model of social market economy 
has every chance of holding its own against the US model in the global contest of systems. 
In the wake of the Asian crisis, at any rate, prospects have improved for European-style 
economic systems, with their dual emphasis on efficiency and social harmony, gaining 
international acceptance as an attractive model. 
 
